very regiment of the Transkei military will stand side by side with the National Party government of the Republic,” in the event of war (Louw 1963:143). Commenting on these successes, Peter Brimelow wrote in the US financial journal Barron’s, “Their state is far and away the most successful on the continent, one to which Blacks immigrate and in whose police force and army they volunteer to serve (Parker 1990: 1).”

From this historical background it is apparent that the ANC, formed in 1912 with the political goal of establishing majority rule in a unified country, did not enjoy universal support from the Bantu population and therefore did not represent ‘people power’. Up until 1960 the ANC, closely allied with the South African Communist Party (SACP), had a limited support base. Many Bantus were content with rising livi

On May 6, 1985, United States (US) intelligence services intercepted the following African National Congress (ANC) broadcast from Ethiopia:

“Ambushes must be prepared for policemen and soldiers… with the aim of capturing weapons from them. Our people must also manufacture home-made bombs and petrol bombs. After arming ourselves in this manner our people must identify collaborators and enemy agents and deal with them.” (Parker 1986:3)

For decades there has been a distorted view that the ANC’s rise to power in South Africa was a product of ‘people power’. Comparisons have been made with the Philippine population, who first used the concept of ‘people power’ to oust dictator Ferdinand Marcos. ‘People power’ occurs when a mass of people rise as one to transform a particular law, policy or circumstance they perceive to be oppressive, immoral or incorrect (Benigno 1995). The central precepts of ‘people power’ are spontaneity and non-violence. Gene Sharp in The Politics of Non-Violent Action (1973) argues these principles to be a fundamental feature of the three main elements of ‘people power’ – symbolic protest and public persuasion, non-cooperation, and peaceful intervention. This report will demonstrate that the ANC’s accession to power is not a product of ‘people power’ as defined above, but occurred as a result of foreign pressure and internal terrorism.

Historically, South Africa’s story differs from other countries colonised by white men. They did not seize the lands of native inhabitants (Louw 1963:15). Around the time that white colonists arrived in 1652, the Bantu invaded from the North, killing the majority of aboriginal inhabitants, the Hottentots and later encountering the white settlers (Louw 1963:16). The collision of these two diverse civilizations placed race relations in the foreground of political debate for the next 300 years.

In 1948, under the leadership of Doctor Daniel Francois Malan, the National Party (NP) came to power with a ‘separate development’ mandate. The NP believed there were only two ways to manage race relations in a heterogonous society: separate development or integration (Marais 1983). In 1950, Prime Minister Dr Hendrik Verwoerd explained the motivation behind separate development, also known as ‘apartheid’, in an address to the Representative Native Council:

“The current government takes the position that it grants others everything it demands for itself. It believes in dominion over its own territory as it believes in the dominion of the Bantu over its territory.” (Giliomee 2004:447)

Parliament designed measures to provide self-government to ten different Bantu groups in their traditional territories (Louw 1963:55), allowing them growth and prosperity in their respective directions (Botha 2005:6). The Oxford Dictionary of Politics (2003:483) defines self-determination as an autonomous institution, able to regulate its own affairs. Bantus warmed to the idea, especially the Bantu Education Act, which enabled them to operate their own schools – 7600 in total. Bantu journalists wrote in opposition newspapers, they “couldn’t be happier” in their newly formed territories (Louw 1963:55). Such was the support for the NP government that Xhosa crowds applauded Transkei Prime Minister Kaizer Matanzima when he proclaimed that “every regiment of the Transkei military will stand side by side with the National Party government of the Republic,” in the event of war (Louw 1963:143). Commenting on these successes, Peter Brimelow wrote in the US financial journal Barron’s, “Their state is far and away the most successful on the continent, one to which Blacks immigrate and in whose police force and army they volunteer to serve (Parker 1990: 1).”

From this historical background it is apparent that the ANC, formed in 1912 with the political goal of establishing majority rule in a unified country, did not enjoy universal support from the Bantu population and therefore did not represent ‘people power’. Up until 1960 the ANC, closely allied with the South African Communist Party (SACP), had a limited support base. Many Bantus were content with rising livin

o be oppressive, immoral or incorrect (Benigno 1995). The central precepts of ‘people power’ are spontaneity and non-violence. Gene Sharp in The Politics of Non-Violent Action (1973) argues these principles to be a fundamental feature of the three main elements of ‘people power’ – symbolic protest and public persuasion, non-cooperation, and peaceful intervention. This report will demonstrate that the ANC’s accession to power is not a product of ‘people power’ as defined above, but occurred as a result of foreign pressure and internal terrorism.

Historically, South Africa’s story differs from other countries colonised by white men. They did not seize the lands of native inhabitants (Louw 1963:15). Around the time that white colonists arrived in 1652, the Bantu invaded from the North, killing the majority of aboriginal inhabitants, the Hottentots and later encountering the white settlers (Louw 1963:16). The collision of these two diverse civilizations placed race relations in the foreground of political debate for the next 300 years.

In 1948, under the leadership of Doctor Daniel Francois Malan, the National Party (NP) came to power with a ‘separate development’ mandate. The NP believed there were only two ways to manage race relations in a heterogonous society: separate development or integration (Marais 1983). In 1950, Prime Minister Dr Hendrik Verwoerd explained the motivation behind separate development, also known as ‘apartheid’, in an address to the Representative Native Council:

“The current government takes the position that it grants others everything it demands for itself. It believes in dominion over its own territory as it believes in the dominion of the Bantu over its territory.” (Giliomee 2004:447)

Parliament designed measures to provide self-government to ten different Bantu groups in their traditional territories (Louw 1963:55), allowing them growth and prosperity in their respective directions (Botha 2005:6). The Oxford Dictionary of Politics (2003:483) defines self-determination as an autonomous institution, able to regulate its own affairs. Bantus warmed to the idea, especially the Bantu Education Act, which enabled them to operate their own schools – 7600 in total. Bantu journalists wrote in opposition newspapers, they “couldn’t be happier” in their newly formed territories (Louw 1963:55). Such was the support for the NP government that Xhosa crowds applauded Transkei Prime Minister Kaizer Matanzima when he proclaimed that “every regiment of the Transkei military will stand side by side with the National Party government of the Republic,” in the event of war (Louw 1963:143). Commenting on these successes, Peter Brimelow wrote in the US financial journal Barron’s, “Their state is far and away the most successful on the continent, one to which Blacks immigrate and in whose police force and army they volunteer to serve (Parker 1990: 1).”

From this historical background it is apparent that the ANC, formed in 1912 with the political goal of establishing majority rule in a unified country, did not enjoy universal support from the Bantu population and therefore did not represent ‘people power’. Up until 1960 the ANC, closely allied with the South African Communist Party (SACP), had a limited support base. Many Bantus were content with rising livi

habitants, the Hottentots and later encountering the white settlers (Louw 1963:16). The collision of these two diverse civilizations placed race relations in the foreground of political debate for the next 300 years.

In 1948, under the leadership of Doctor Daniel Francois Malan, the National Party (NP) came to power with a ‘separate development’ mandate. The NP believed there were only two ways to manage race relations in a heterogonous society: separate development or integration (Marais 1983). In 1950, Prime Minister Dr Hendrik Verwoerd explained the motivation behind separate development, also known as ‘apartheid’, in an address to the Representative Native Council:

“The current government takes the position that it grants others everything it demands for itself. It believes in dominion over its own territory as it believes in the dominion of the Bantu over its territory.” (Giliomee 2004:447)

Parliament designed measures to provide self-government to ten different Bantu groups in their traditional territories (Louw 1963:55), allowing them growth and prosperity in their respective directions (Botha 2005:6). The Oxford Dictionary of Politics (2003:483) defines self-determination as an autonomous institution, able to regulate its own affairs. Bantus warmed to the idea, especially the Bantu Education Act, which enabled them to operate their own schools – 7600 in total. Bantu journalists wrote in opposition newspapers, they “couldn’t be happier” in their newly formed territories (Louw 1963:55). Such was the support for the NP government that Xhosa crowds applauded Transkei Prime Minister Kaizer Matanzima when he proclaimed that “every regiment of the Transkei military will stand side by side with the National Party government of the Republic,” in the event of war (Louw 1963:143). Commenting on these successes, Peter Brimelow wrote in the US financial journal Barron’s, “Their state is far and away the most successful on the continent, one to which Blacks immigrate and in whose police force and army they volunteer to serve (Parker 1990: 1).”

From this historical background it is apparent that the ANC, formed in 1912 with the political goal of establishing majority rule in a unified country, did not enjoy universal support from the Bantu population and therefore did not represent ‘people power’. Up until 1960 the ANC, closely allied with the South African Communist Party (SACP), had a limited support base. Many Bantus were content with rising livi

s it believes in the dominion of the Bantu over its territory.” (Giliomee 2004:447)

Parliament designed measures to provide self-government to ten different Bantu groups in their traditional territories (Louw 1963:55), allowing them growth and prosperity in their respective directions (Botha 2005:6). The Oxford Dictionary of Politics (2003:483) defines self-determination as an autonomous institution, able to regulate its own affairs. Bantus warmed to the idea, especially the Bantu Education Act, which enabled them to operate their own schools – 7600 in total. Bantu journalists wrote in opposition newspapers, they “couldn’t be happier” in their newly formed territories (Louw 1963:55). Such was the support for the NP government that Xhosa crowds applauded Transkei Prime Minister Kaizer Matanzima when he proclaimed that “every regiment of the Transkei military will stand side by side with the National Party government of the Republic,” in the event of war (Louw 1963:143). Commenting on these successes, Peter Brimelow wrote in the US financial journal Barron’s, “Their state is far and away the most successful on the continent, one to which Blacks immigrate and in whose police force and army they volunteer to serve (Parker 1990: 1).”

From this historical background it is apparent that the ANC, formed in 1912 with the political goal of establishing majority rule in a unified country, did not enjoy universal support from the Bantu population and therefore did not represent ‘people power’. Up until 1960 the ANC, closely allied with the South African Communist Party (SACP), had a limited support base. Many Bantus were content with rising livi

very regiment of the Transkei military will stand side by side with the National Party government of the Republic,” in the event of war (Louw 1963:143). Commenting on these successes, Peter Brimelow wrote in the US financial journal Barron’s, “Their state is far and away the most successful on the continent, one to which Blacks immigrate and in whose police force and army they volunteer to serve (Parker 1990: 1).”

From this historical background it is apparent that the ANC, formed in 1912 with the political goal of establishing majority rule in a unified country, did not enjoy universal support from the Bantu population and therefore did not represent ‘people power’. Up until 1960 the ANC, closely allied with the South African Communist Party (SACP), had a limited support base. Many Bantus were content with rising living standards, and United Nations (UN) assemblies throughout the 1950’s regarded the ANC as insignificant (Louw 1963). Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and Zulu leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi, representing the largest ethnic group in South Africa, praised the NP government by pointing out, “[it] would be the first time that a Metropolitan power such as South Africa has relinquished power voluntarily to a subject nation like ourselves.”

Confronted by a stable government with a clear vision, the ANC realised in 1961 they could only achieve their revolution through mass intimidation. Hence the birth of their terrorist wing Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the Spear of the Nation. Events leading up to majority rule in 1994 prove that MK, organised by SACP leader Joe Slovo and Nelson Mandela, were not even freedom fighters let alone advocates of ‘people power’. A freedom fighter wears a uniform and fights an army. Conversely, a terrorist targets innocent, defenseless citizens and cannot be identified. As Parker (1986:5) puts it, “[the ANC’s] is a coward’s war. They prefer to target, kill and mutilate the helpless, the unarmed, the innocent.” Their express goal was to terrify the Bantu population of South Africa into submission. On July 8, 1985, ANC President Oliver Tambo stated from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia:

“For months we have maintained an uninterrupted offensive against the puppet local government authorities in the Black areas as well as other state personnel, police and their agents.” (Parker 1986: 13)

The ANC believed that by creating terror and chaos in Bantu territories, making South Africa ungovernable, they could exact support from terrified citizens. As an ANC cleric threatened a crowd of 10 000 Bantus in 1986, “You either join us or we fight against you!” (Parker 1986: 10) Since the ANC could not gain support through non-violent public persuasion, they resorted to acts of terrorism, coercing support from terrified citizens. Such actions cannot be categorised as ‘people power’.

According to Mandela, MK received revolutionary training in Cuba, Algeria, Ethiopia, North Korea, the USSR as well as other communist states (Parker 1986: 2). They used the necklace as their favoured tool. Heeding Winnie Mandela’s call on April 13, 1986, “Together, hand in hand with our boxes of matches and necklaces we shall liberate this country,” comrades bound or chopped off the hands of victims, placed petrol-filled tyres around their necks, and set then alight (Parker 1986: 2). This horrific instrument, which accounted for thousands of brutal murders, including the deaths of hundreds of IFP members can hardly be considered an instrument of peaceful intervention. In 1993, the Zulu newspaper Illanga reported in disgust:

“The practical manifestations of this ‘struggle’ are often expressed in the mundane business of murder of opponents by Umkhonto we Sizwe, whose death squads travel the townships clad in leather jackets and high fashion boots. These are not soldiers, but executioners.” (Parker 1993: 10)

According to IFP documents, the ANC assassinated IFP leaders at a rate of one every six days (Parker 1993: 2). These terror tactics worked in the ANC’s favour. In 1986, over 27 Bantu mayors and 240 major officials resigned from high positions in Bantu self-determined territories (Parker 1986: