may have for believing in God, there is nothing in the material order as scientifically construed to render such a conclusion impossible; but that, on the contrary, the so-called natural order has been found to present data which make this spiritual interpretation highly probable. On the other hand, positively, and with the ground thus cleared, the foregoing chapters have attempted to outline the three, or possibly four, major lines of reasoning by which this spiritual interpretation is forthcoming.

No claim is made that this reasoning has been flawless; and

The religious philosophy differs from other forms of human inquiry in the serious and even personal concern with which it is compelled to face its task. The reason for this is not far to seek. One may be interested in natural science or in other branches of philosophy, and to a considerable extent this will depend upon individual taste. But while a scientific or metaphysical investigation is capable of yielding immense personal satisfaction, as well as many practical contributions to human life, it would be rash to assert that without their pursuit man's ultimate destiny would be seriously affected. No one can say this about religion. This is not to disparage science; for it is science that has given us the modern world. In this higher sphere religion stands alone, and its truth is a matter of supreme concern; for the whole meaning of life depends on it. No moral or spiritual incentives, however ethically ennobling or aesthetically satisfying, which, when challenged to present their credentials, have nothing more to offer than a pious appeal to the beauty of the good life, can satisfy this demand. Man must know.

Nor can we long continue to revere an idea, albeit a religious idea, that has been proved to be fictitious. What is at stake, then, to every student of religious philosophy is the truth itself, and the whole of it; and only as religion is true, and because it is true, can we proceed with the further problems that present themselves. It will be well, therefore, before taking up the subjects to be dealt with in this and the following chapters, to review the ground thus far covered. Although it will never be possible, as any study of epistemology makes apparent, to prove the existence of God with the cogency and finality of a mathematical demonstration, it has been shown that the validity of a spiritual interpretation of the universe rests on solid ground. Looked at negatively, since no theistic view of the world is compatible with the claims of the older mechanistic philosophy, the complete breakdown of the older materialistic viewpoint and the fairly widespread shift of scientific opinion toward what virtually amounts to an idealistic interpretation of nature have been cited as evidence that, quite apart from any positive reasons we may have for believing in God, there is nothing in the material order as scientifically construed to render such a conclusion impossible; but that, on the contrary, the so-called natural order has been found to present data which make this spiritual interpretation highly probable. On the other hand, positively, and with the ground thus cleared, the foregoing chapters have attempted to outline the three, or possibly four, major lines of reasoning by which this spiritual interpretation is forthcoming.

No claim is made that this reasoning has been flawless; and s

estiny would be seriously affected. No one can say this about religion. This is not to disparage science; for it is science that has given us the modern world. In this higher sphere religion stands alone, and its truth is a matter of supreme concern; for the whole meaning of life depends on it. No moral or spiritual incentives, however ethically ennobling or aesthetically satisfying, which, when challenged to present their credentials, have nothing more to offer than a pious appeal to the beauty of the good life, can satisfy this demand. Man must know.

Nor can we long continue to revere an idea, albeit a religious idea, that has been proved to be fictitious. What is at stake, then, to every student of religious philosophy is the truth itself, and the whole of it; and only as religion is true, and because it is true, can we proceed with the further problems that present themselves. It will be well, therefore, before taking up the subjects to be dealt with in this and the following chapters, to review the ground thus far covered. Although it will never be possible, as any study of epistemology makes apparent, to prove the existence of God with the cogency and finality of a mathematical demonstration, it has been shown that the validity of a spiritual interpretation of the universe rests on solid ground. Looked at negatively, since no theistic view of the world is compatible with the claims of the older mechanistic philosophy, the complete breakdown of the older materialistic viewpoint and the fairly widespread shift of scientific opinion toward what virtually amounts to an idealistic interpretation of nature have been cited as evidence that, quite apart from any positive reasons we may have for believing in God, there is nothing in the material order as scientifically construed to render such a conclusion impossible; but that, on the contrary, the so-called natural order has been found to present data which make this spiritual interpretation highly probable. On the other hand, positively, and with the ground thus cleared, the foregoing chapters have attempted to outline the three, or possibly four, major lines of reasoning by which this spiritual interpretation is forthcoming.

No claim is made that this reasoning has been flawless; and

we long continue to revere an idea, albeit a religious idea, that has been proved to be fictitious. What is at stake, then, to every student of religious philosophy is the truth itself, and the whole of it; and only as religion is true, and because it is true, can we proceed with the further problems that present themselves. It will be well, therefore, before taking up the subjects to be dealt with in this and the following chapters, to review the ground thus far covered. Although it will never be possible, as any study of epistemology makes apparent, to prove the existence of God with the cogency and finality of a mathematical demonstration, it has been shown that the validity of a spiritual interpretation of the universe rests on solid ground. Looked at negatively, since no theistic view of the world is compatible with the claims of the older mechanistic philosophy, the complete breakdown of the older materialistic viewpoint and the fairly widespread shift of scientific opinion toward what virtually amounts to an idealistic interpretation of nature have been cited as evidence that, quite apart from any positive reasons we may have for believing in God, there is nothing in the material order as scientifically construed to render such a conclusion impossible; but that, on the contrary, the so-called natural order has been found to present data which make this spiritual interpretation highly probable. On the other hand, positively, and with the ground thus cleared, the foregoing chapters have attempted to outline the three, or possibly four, major lines of reasoning by which this spiritual interpretation is forthcoming.

No claim is made that this reasoning has been flawless; and

existence of God with the cogency and finality of a mathematical demonstration, it has been shown that the validity of a spiritual interpretation of the universe rests on solid ground. Looked at negatively, since no theistic view of the world is compatible with the claims of the older mechanistic philosophy, the complete breakdown of the older materialistic viewpoint and the fairly widespread shift of scientific opinion toward what virtually amounts to an idealistic interpretation of nature have been cited as evidence that, quite apart from any positive reasons we may have for believing in God, there is nothing in the material order as scientifically construed to render such a conclusion impossible; but that, on the contrary, the so-called natural order has been found to present data which make this spiritual interpretation highly probable. On the other hand, positively, and with the ground thus cleared, the foregoing chapters have attempted to outline the three, or possibly four, major lines of reasoning by which this spiritual interpretation is forthcoming.

No claim is made that this reasoning has been flawless; and

may have for believing in God, there is nothing in the material order as scientifically construed to render such a conclusion impossible; but that, on the contrary, the so-called natural order has been found to present data which make this spiritual interpretation highly probable. On the other hand, positively, and with the ground thus cleared, the foregoing chapters have attempted to outline the three, or possibly four, major lines of reasoning by which this spiritual interpretation is forthcoming.

No claim is made that this reasoning has been flawless; and still less that such evidence is all we require. As repeatedly stated in the course of our discussion, belief in God, if it is to be certitude, must in the last analysis rest in the indubitable testimony of personal experience. But while it has been the fashion in many quarters to decry the so-called "proofs," it can scarcely be denied that if these classical arguments for God's existence are given the serious consideration we bestow on other and lesser matters, until more substantial reasons can be found to the contrary they will continue to hold their place among thoughtful men. Stated briefly, the causal, or cosmological, argument leads to the conclusion that the existence of a material world -- existing, as we have reason to believe our real world exists, against a space-time background, and including its energy content both past and present - cannot be adequately accounted for save on the assumption of a First Cause, itself uncaused, by whose activity and will it has been called into being.